Leaving Iraq, never easy
Thomas Friedman's columns about Iraq have been widely ridiculed. In fact, a period of six months has become known in the liberal blogosphere as a "Friedman unit" after his assertions, repeated frequently since November 2003, that "the next six months" would be critical in Iraq.
In spite of his strange slowness to recognize the Iraq War for the disaster it is, Friedman does occasionally show considerable insight into foreign policy matters. With that in mind, his recent column about withdrawl, "The ins and outs of leaving Iraq," makes interesting reading.
He begins by declaring Bush's stay-the-course approach to be "bankrupt," then asserts that gradual withdrawal is not workable -- citing the disastrous consequences of the British drawdown in Basra. Then he writes:
What he's describing here, of course, is a direct parallel to the end of the Vietnam war -- that terrible helicopter-on-the-embassy-roof moment where people desperately scramble to get out before we leave.
He goes on to suggest -- somewhat disturbingly -- that leaving Iraq would also free us up to attack Iran if it becomes necessary. It strikes me, though, that his other arguments are basically the same ones Democrats in Congress have been making for months now -- that the Iraqis will not make progress in running their own country until they know we're going to leave. This argument suggests that setting a firm withdrawal date could be the best thing we could do, not, as Bush suggests, a fatal sign of weakness to the terrorists. In fact, Friedman writes:
I hope some of our Senators and Representatives are reading, because what Friedman has articulated here is a compromise position that nearly everyone should be able to support, with the exception of Bush and his shrinking circle of true believers.
In spite of his strange slowness to recognize the Iraq War for the disaster it is, Friedman does occasionally show considerable insight into foreign policy matters. With that in mind, his recent column about withdrawl, "The ins and outs of leaving Iraq," makes interesting reading.
He begins by declaring Bush's stay-the-course approach to be "bankrupt," then asserts that gradual withdrawal is not workable -- citing the disastrous consequences of the British drawdown in Basra. Then he writes:
We must not kid ourselves: Our real choices in Iraq are either all in or all out -- with the exception of Kurdistan. If those are our only real choices, then we need to look clearly at each.
Staying in means simply containing the Iraqi civil war, but at the price of Americans and Iraqis continuing to die, and at the price of the United States having no real leverage on the parties inside or outside of Iraq to negotiate a settlement, because everyone knows we're staying so they can dither. Today, U.S. soldiers are making the maximum sacrifice so Iraqi politicians can hold to their maximum positions.
Getting out, on the other hand, means more ethnic, religious, and tribal killings all across Iraq. It will be one of the most morally ugly scenes you can imagine -- no less than Darfur. You will see U.S. troops withdrawing and Iraqi civilians and soldiers who have supported us clinging to our tanks for protection as we rumble out the door. We need to take with us everyone who helped us and wants out, and give green cards to as many Iraqis as possible.
What he's describing here, of course, is a direct parallel to the end of the Vietnam war -- that terrible helicopter-on-the-embassy-roof moment where people desperately scramble to get out before we leave.
But getting out has at least four advantages. First, no more Americans will be dying while refereeing a civil war. Second, the fear of an all-out civil war, as we do prepare to leave, may be the last best hope for getting the Iraqis to reach an 11th-hour political agreement. Third, as civil war in Iraq plays out, it could, painfully, force the realignment of communities on the ground that may create a more stable foundation upon which to build a federal settlement.
He goes on to suggest -- somewhat disturbingly -- that leaving Iraq would also free us up to attack Iran if it becomes necessary. It strikes me, though, that his other arguments are basically the same ones Democrats in Congress have been making for months now -- that the Iraqis will not make progress in running their own country until they know we're going to leave. This argument suggests that setting a firm withdrawal date could be the best thing we could do, not, as Bush suggests, a fatal sign of weakness to the terrorists. In fact, Friedman writes:
For all those reasons, I prefer setting a withdrawal date, but accompanying it with a last-ditch U.N.-led -- not U.S. -- diplomatic effort to get the Iraqi parties to resolve their political differences. If they can't agree -- even with a gun to their heads about to go off -- staying is truly pointless and leaving by a set date is the only option.
I hope some of our Senators and Representatives are reading, because what Friedman has articulated here is a compromise position that nearly everyone should be able to support, with the exception of Bush and his shrinking circle of true believers.
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